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1. Peaceful European states

The member states of the European Union claim to be part of a community of democratic as well as peaceful states. But why should we expect Europe to be peaceful in an international system which is said to be anarchic and which is lacking a strong world state who could deter aggression and enforce compliance with international law?

In the literature about International Relations (IR) we can basically find two arguments to support the hope for a peaceful foreign policy of the EU and its member states. The first argument focuses on the peaceful attitude of European foreign policy elites. In the early 1970s François Duchêne introduced this argument saying that the dominant role model for European foreign policy was that of a "civilian power". After the end of the Cold War Hanns Maull elaborated on the meaning of civilian power for Germany as well as for the EU as a collective foreign policy actor. According to him, the "civilian power" role model includes military restraint, compliance with and promotion of international regimes, international law, and civilized international relations in order to advance a peaceful world order based on human rights and democracy. More recently, Robert Kagan was referring to this argument as well, but in a negative way, arguing that the weakness of European foreign policy was based on the perception of international relations by European foreign policy elites as a


This top-down analysis of European foreign policy is both of an empirical and a prescriptive character. It claims that the foreign policy of EU member states does conform to the civilian power role model and it advises policy-making élites that they should follow this role model. However, we do not know how stable role models for foreign policy are and perhaps we should not simply put our trust in the wisdom of foreign policy élites. At least on the stage, actors can very well change roles.

A very different argument - and the argument I am going to discuss in the rest of my presentation - is based on the very lively debate about the so-called democratic peace. For many decades empirical studies had informed us that democracies were just as belligerent as non-democracies. We were watching the US fighting in Vietnam, the UK in the Falklands, France in Africa, India against Pakistan and so on. During the Cold War Western democracies were even prepared to wage nuclear war. So one could hardly claim that democracies were more peaceful than other states. One could even postulate - as realist IR theory did - that domestic politics did not count at all in international relations, that it was all about power and security. But then in the mid-1980s Michael Doyle checked the war statistics again and drew the attention of IR researchers to the fact that democracies never fight war against each other and that they are rarely involved in militarized disputes with other democracies (Hasenclever 2003: 199-201). The absence of war between democracies, the so-called "dyadic" democratic peace, has been widely accepted as a robust empirical fact among IR scholars. Proponents of the democratic peace theory even claim that the dyadic peace among democracies is
"... as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations" (Levy 1988: 662).

In recent years another version of the democratic peace theory is gaining support. Proponents of the so-called "monadic" version claim that democracies are less violent in general, not only in their relations with other democracies. But if democracies are just as belligerent as non-democracies, how can this be? The monadic analysis is more careful about the meaning of "war" and "democracy". The monadic analysis is not restricted to explaining only the frequency of war involvement, but rather takes into account the degree of violence used in foreign relations. It also requires a more differentiated analysis of the conditions and effects of democratic participation of the citizens in foreign policy-making.

Generally, democratic peace theory would suggest that the military restraint of European states is not (only) based on élite attitudes but rather on the existence of societal demands and their processing within the democratic system. However, the detailed mechanisms and logic of the monadic democratic peace has not been uncovered yet.

Ten years ago the prominent German peace researcher Ernst-Otto Czempiel argued in an journal article that the incomplete democratic peace, i.e. the absence of war only between democracies, could be explained by the incomplete democratization of foreign policy, especially the deficient parliamentary control of military security policy (Czempiel 1996). But so far, the role of parliaments has been neglected in the democratic peace research. Likewise, there is hardly any comparative research on the role of parliaments in security policy. Czempiel's idea inspired my colleague Stefan Marschall, an expert on comparative parliamentarianism, and me, having focused on peace research from an IR perspective so far, to design a joint research project on what we call the parliamentary peace.

We were even more motivated to do this project when we observed European foreign policy during the Iraq crisis in early 2003. The US-led coalition of the willing was starting to fight an unprovoked, full-sized offensive war without the required mandate of the UN Security Council. In January 2003, shortly before the attack on Iraq, EOS Gallup Europe conducted an opinion poll among citizens in the EU-25, i.e. the then 15 member states of the EU plus the 10 states who were scheduled to join the EU in 2004. The poll found that although 66 per cent agreed that Iraq posed a serious threat to world peace, 82 per cent would not support their countries' participation in the US led military intervention without UN mandate. A clear majority in all EU-25 states backed the rejection of war participation without UN mandate. Despite of strong public disapproval some of the EU-25 actively participated in the US-led war coalition, even to the degree of the UK who sent sizeable combat troops to the Iraqi battlefield.

We decided to adopt the case of the Iraq war as a hard case for our research project because it is an obvious challenge to the monadic theory of the democratic peace. Therefore, as a more precise hypothesis of our project we postulate that the degree of parliamentary control of any EU-25 state should correlate with the degree of its involvement – or rather non-involvement – in the Iraq war. In the course of our research we expect to take some evidence of the existence of a "parliamentary peace" as a substantiation of the monadic version of the theory of the "democratic peace". The project proposal has been approved for funding by the German National Research Fund and has just started in February this year.
In what follows I would like to present the theoretical background of the research project as well as the project design. I would be very glad if you could share your thoughts about the project with me and welcome any comments, criticisms and suggestions.

2. Theoretical framework: "Democratic peace"

2.1 The logic of the democratic peace

Prevailing liberal explanations for the two versions of the democratic peace focus primarily on rational choice inputs into political institutions and on socially constructed normative or cultural constraints. In democracies the political participation of the citizens should make both the rationalist and the normative motives relevant for foreign and security policymaking.

The rationalist explanation can be traced back to the late 18th century German philosopher Immanuel Kant. He argued that democracies hesitate to fight war because of the participation of rational citizens in the decision-making process:

"If ... the consent of the citizens is required to decide whether or not war is to be declared, it is very natural that they will have great hesitation in embarking on so dangerous an enterprise. For this would mean calling down on themselves all the miseries of war, such as doing the fighting themselves, supplying the costs of the war from their own resources, painfully making good the ensuing devastation..." (Kant 1795; english translation taken from Risse-Kappen 1999: 24).

According to Kant rational citizens will hesitate to risk their lives and property for national warfare. An aggressive foreign policy would run counter to the individual welfare interests of the citizens and the citizens would only support war for the immediate defense of their nation and the very foundations of national welfare. Thus rational cost-benefit calculations of the citizens' account for the decision-makers' reluctance to engage in warfare if citizens' preferences enter into the political decision-making process. This is assumed to be the case in modern democracies which are marked by "representative governments, legal equality of all citizens, protection of private property, and operation of market-oriented economies [which] … enable individuals to exercise their rational opposition to the costs of war as a powerful domestic constraint on the use of force" (Allison 2001).

More detailed research on the utilitarian explanation has found, however, that rational behavior will not always lead to peace and that rational preferences might contradict each other sometimes. For example, democratic states' warfare could be compatible with citizens' cost-benefit calculations in the following three cases:

1. Powerful interest groups might sometimes favor warfare. If they enjoy privileged access to political decision-making, they might be able to shift the costs of warfare to the whole nation if these costs stay moderate. For example there could be limited military interventions for the benefit of national corporations' interests abroad.
2. The majority of the citizens would not oppose warfare if the costs and risks of warfare could be shifted to a small minority, like, for example, in the case of a professional army where professional soldiers - and not conscripts - have to risk their lives.

3. Citizens would tolerate small and short wars where there is little risk for national soldiers, for example attacks with superior air power (Müller/Risse-Kappen 1990; Risse-Kappen 1991; 1999).

Another rationalist-institutionalist argument for the democratic peace relates to the complexity of democratic decision-making. Open democratic institutions and multiple checks and balances are part of democratic political systems. These very characteristics of democracies tend to slow down decision-making and thus help to avoid major foreign policy adventures. Political leaders in democracies are also constrained by the size of the so-called "winning coalitions" they have to mobilize to support war decisions. Winning coalitions in democracies tend to extend well beyond the small elite groups authoritarian leaders have to mobilize (Risse-Kappen 1999: 25; Bueno de Mesquita/Lalman 1992; Morgan/Campbell 1991; Russett 1993: 38-40; Bueno de Mesquita/Morrow/Siverson/Smith 1999). Maoz and Russet summarize this argument, suggesting that

"...due to the complexity of the democratic process and the requirement of securing a broad base of support for risky policies, democratic leaders are reluctant to wage wars, except in cases wherein war seems a necessity or when the war aims are seen as justifying the mobilization costs" (Maoz/Russett 1993: 626).

The normative or cultural explanation focuses on norms prevailing in democracies. Democratic values are supposed to emphasize compromise, rule of law and respect for human dignity and to condemn the use of force as a means to resolve political conflicts. As these norms are regarded to be universal they tend to be externalized and to be applied to foreign relations as well (Maoz/Russett 1993; Doyle 1986; Russett 1993; Hasenclever 2003: 205; Risse-Kappen 1999; Gowa 1995).

However, subsequent research has qualified the normative explanation for the democratic peace as well. There is ample historical experience that public opinion may very well be in favor of war mobilization against military threats to the nation or for humanitarian purposes. Levy, for example refers to

"...numerous historical cases in which the public appears all too eager for war, from the American Civil War to the eve of World War I in Europe to contemporary "identity wars." In some cases this popular enthusiasm for war may push political leaders into adopting more aggressive and risky policies than they would have preferred" (Levy 1998: 152).

The "rally 'round the flag effect" and the "CNN effect" are additional examples for a normative mobilization of the citizens in favor of war. The "rally 'round the flag" summarizes observations of a rapid but short-lived increase in the support for the government triggered by an international crisis. Examples of such rallies are the Falkland war rally in the UK or the 9/11 rally in the United States. The "CNN effect" is a term that originated in the extensive media
coverage of the humanitarian emergency in Somalia and subsequent public calls for military interventions by the United States and the United Nations.

These two effects do not just happen incidentally, but political leaders can also utilize them deliberately. Research on the diversionary use of conflict escalation "seems to imply that low-level disputes can potentially provide electoral rewards to those in power" (Prins/ Sprecher 1999: 272; Smith 1996; Stoll 1984).

2.2 The monadic version of the democratic peace

Thus the logic of the democratic peace seems to be much more complicated than initially expected. As has already been mentioned, recent studies on the democratic peace also challenged the idea of a separate democratic peace, i.e. the dyadic version of the theory that restricts the scope of the democratic peace to relationships between democratic states. For a long time a very strong argument for the dyadic version was the observation that democracies do not wage war against only each other and that there is no significant difference in the general war involvement between democracies and non-democracies.

More recently the significance of the "frequency of war" indicator and thus the focus on the dyadic version of the democratic peace has been challenged. Starting with Rudolph J. Rummel researchers have turned to other indicators of war proneness or have turned to the degree of violence as the dependent variable of democratic state's foreign relations (Rummel 1995). These studies focus for example on dispute initiation, number of casualties or willingness to accept third party mediation. Based on such a redefinition of "peaceful behavior" Rummel and other found that democracies behave in fact significantly less violent than non-democracies (Rummel 1995; Ray 1995; Fendius Elman 1997: 15–18; Russett/Starr 2000; MacMillan 2003: 235). This called for more thorough research on the peacefulness of democracies in general, making the monadic version of the democratic peace theory more prominent.

But there is still another puzzle to be solved. Up to now, most studies treat democracies as a homogeneous set of states. They are largely comparing and explaining differences regarding the war proneness (or peace propensity) between democracies and nondemocratic states. Variances among democracies are rarely addressed (Huth/Allee 2002). The democracy category is thus treated as a homogeneous category. But there is some empirical evidence of substantial variation in the conflict behavior of democratic states, such as the case of the EU-25 and the Iraq war in 2003 (Auerswald 2000; Fendius Elman 2000; Palmer/London/Regan 2004).

Moreover, most statistical analyses of the democratic peace use a very superficial definition of the democracy category based on the Polity index, a standardized index of the world political systems with very formal criteria such as the guarantee of basic political rights, regular elections and the political accountability of governments (Palmer/London/Regan 2004: 3). The underlying democracy theory is rarely made explicit.
Here Ernst-Otto Czem piel comes in. He recommended to focus the analysis on the specific mechanisms of citizens' participation and proposed to re-phrase the research question of democratic peace theory in the following way:

"The question is not any more, whether or not democracies are peaceful, but: Are there societal demands for a foreign policy renouncing military violence, in a specific country and in a specific period of time? Are these demands expressed and transferred for processing into the political system? Are these demands being modified then, for example by inputs of unofficial interest groups eluding public attention? Do these societies have means of control at their disposal in order to monitor the execution of their demand and to sanction violations of them?" (Czemiel 1996: 89 [translation by Hartwig Hummel]).

2.3 Unbundling the monadic peace: The role of parliamentary control

According to Czemiel in modern industrialized societies societal control of foreign and security policy is mainly executed by parliaments (Czemiel 1996: 91). However, the role of parliaments has been mostly ignored in the democratic peace literature so far. Substantial research can be found only regarding the role of the US congress. But the case of the US must be regarded as a very special case, which cannot be generalized for European countries. Most importantly, the United States has a presidential system and a long tradition of separation of powers. On the other hand, the European countries usually are parliamentarian democracies where governments and parliamentary majorities are closely linked with each other.

The specific contribution of parliaments to the democratization of policy processes in general, including security policy, is the promotion of public responsiveness. Parliaments are places of institutionalized transparency. They work in public and transfer exclusive and intransparent political processes within the executive branch to the public arena (Marschall 1999). They force the government to give normative reasons.

Moreover, parliaments are regarded as highly responsive institutions. Members of parliament have to be responsive because of regular parliamentary elections. They are supposed to be very sensitive to changing preferences communicated to them by the electorate (Brettschneider 1996); Herzog 1993). Therefore a popular aversion to a specific war should find its first expression in parliament and not in government. The immediate responsiveness of the parliamentarians for a popular mood against war participation might even be effective in parliamentary democracies with their close functional links between parliamentary majority and the government.

The relationship between the citizens, parliament and the government can be understood in terms of a double principal-agent relationship (Gilardi/Braun 2002). In the first link (Mitchell 2000) parliaments are agents of electorates as principals. Because parliaments are accountable to the citizens they should oppose war if the citizens are against war participation. The second principal-agent relationship links parliaments as principals the governments as agents. Governments are supposed to execute parliaments' orders. Even in security issues where governments often enjoy considerable freedom of action parliamentary elected governments usually seek agreement with parliamentary majorities.
But the role of parliaments cannot be reduced to the relationship between the majority and the government. Parliamentary control as the precondition as well as one of the main functions of modern parliamentarians also has to take into account the role of the opposition in parliament as well as members of parliaments as individual actors. Parliamentary control has two dimensions. First, it can be thought of as critical monitoring and supervision of government action. Second it can mean co-governance by parliaments in policy-making. In parliamentary democracies, control as monitoring is usually the task of the opposition while control as co-governance is performed by the parliamentary majority. Individual members of parliaments can join in the monitoring, for example when they use their right to question the government or when they dissent in parliamentary votes. While the final vote is based on parliamentary majorities parliamentary minorities have many chances to influence an ongoing decision-making process. Minorities cannot prevent majority decisions but they can slow them down and subject the political process to public debate (Steffani 1999). Thus, parliamentary control can be executed even in cases when the parliamentary majority and the government are in close agreement. Therefore we should expect parliamentary control to have some influence, even in security policy making of parliamentary democracies.

But still we have to explain why democracies use violence in their foreign relations, and in particular, why some European parliaments let their governments participate in the Iraq war despite public opposition against the war. There are some suggestions in the literature how this question could be answered. Gaubatz for example observed that democracies enter into wars more often shortly after elections than immediately before elections (Gaubatz 1999). Czempiel argued that, in the context of democratic peace, parliamentary control should not be reduced to constitutional and institutional issues but should take into consideration the societal and cultural preconditions such as the existence of a war aversive citizenship (Czempiel 1996: 91). Czempiel also stressed that particularly Western democracies did not yet establish full democratic participation and control in the case of security issues (Czempiel 1996: 98). Keller challenged the assumption that democratic constraints are constant and proposed to focus on the re-interpretation of parliamentary constraints during crisis decision-making, stating that

"... such constraints may also appear dangerous or illegitimate, particularly in the domain of crisis decision making: when the stakes are very high, the vociferous intragovernmental or societal opposition that one leader views as a legitimate product of the democratic process that must be taken into account may be interpreted by another leader as activity that is misguided, unpatriotic, and detrimental to state interests" (Keller 2005: 208).

Prins and Sprecher even suggested that in parliamentary democracies coalition governments, rather than single-party governments, would be willing to resort to the use of military power (Prins/Sprecher 1999: 271). Finally, Jan Hoekema (Hoekema 2004), in his case study of Dutch UN peacekeepers who were present at the massacre in Srebrenica in 1995, came to the conclusion that parliaments may find it hard to distance themselves from government decision makers when they have become co-deciders.

Having reviewed the literature we came to the conclusion that we cannot simply assume that citizens' preferences will automatically enter into government policymaking. We have to
analyze in detail whether and how parliaments as intermediaries link majority preferences among citizens to government decisions (Hasenclever 2003: 212).

3. Research Design

In our research project we examine the hypothesis that powerful parliaments will behave responsive to a prevailing war aversion among citizens and will therefore effectively constrain government security policy. Following Czempiel's suggestion we thus operationalize democratization of security policy as parliamentarization. As part of the project, for the first time the scope and impact of parliamentary control over security policy will be systematically examined in detail for all EU-25 states.

To be able to measure the degree of parliamentarization in each state we will develop an index of parliamentary control over security policy. The foreign policy behavior of the EU-25 governments will be measured on the basis of yet another index at the beginning of the war and 90 days afterwards (cf. below).

Subsequently, the two sets of data will be correlated in order to identify significant patterns of association between the two variables "degree of parliamentary control over security policy" and "degree of participation in the Iraq war". Within the scope of the current research project we will not be able to conduct case studies yet. Depending on the results of our research we are thinking of extending our research to deviant or crucial case studies in a follow-up project.

We chose to examine the parliamentary peace not in a static and abstract way but to look at the functioning of parliamentary control regarding the case of the Iraq war 2003. There a several reason for our choice:

1. Clear and unmistakable majorities of the citizens were opposed to the military intervention immediately before it started (EOS-Gallup Europe 2003). We can therefore presuppose that – in Czempiel terms – in all EU-25 countries "societal demands for a foreign policy renouncing military violence, in a specific country and in a specific period of time" were expressed. In other words: If governments participated in warfare they did not do so because of a lack of public opposition.

2. The decision to participate in the Iraq war was not a crisis decision, which could have justified emergency decision-making beyond usual parliamentary control. The decision-making started almost one year before the actual intervention. Thus there was ample space for parliaments to get involved.

3. The issue clearly was about war participation, not about peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, low intensity warfare or collective mandated by the UN Security Council. Unlike the recent study of parliamentary control of military intervention by Hans Born and Heiner Hänggi (Born/Hänggi 2004; cf. the review of this book by Everts 2005), which focused on multilateral peacekeeping, the Iraq war must be regarded as a hard case for the democratic peace debate.
4. As EU member states or EU accession states all EU-25 consider themselves to be members of a security community. Therefore the effect of external factors such as NATO membership has to be regarded as of minor relevance. Besides, NATO was only indirectly involved in the Iraq intervention in the context of protecting Turkey (Mutz 2003: 132).

5. The Iraq war case is particularly interesting because of the remarkable variance in the actual behavior of the EU-25 governments ranging from full participation in combat to outspoken position to the war. However, the exact degree of war involvement has to be examined yet.

6. Although a systematic survey of parliamentary control of security policy in the EU-25 is lacking so far, it seems to be probable that we will come across varying degrees of parliamentary control. For example, the EU-25 include different types of parliamentary as well a semi-presidential systems. Moreover, democratization in the EU-25 occurred during different "waves" (Huntington 1991). Therefore we will encounter consolidated and experienced as well as young and untested traditions of parliamentary control (Mansfield/Snyder 1995; 1996).

3.1 Measuring parliamentary control capabilities

Part of the project will be to develop an instrument to measure parliamentary control capability relating to foreign and security policy. We will both include rationalist as well as normative control motives. Rationalist control is based on cost-benefit calculations and on the enforcement of rules by sanctions. Normative control is based on the integration of social groups such as political parties or coalition governments and on the need to comply with the basic values of these groups.

In order to measure parliamentary control capabilities we will collect constitutions, parliamentary rules for procedure, legislation concerning budgetary approval by parliament, special legislation concerning deployment of military and para-military forces abroad, special legislation regulating covert military action by secret services. We will also collect data about personnel, time, expert, and information resources of parliaments devoted to the control of foreign and security issues. Depending on our own research capabilities we will also include date about elections, political parties and coalition arrangements for the period during the Iraq crisis under examination. We will greatly benefit form research by the Geneva-based Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, which has already collected relevant information for 17 of the 25 members of the EU-25.

We were originally planning to form one single index for the overall degree of parliamentary control and put each of the EU-25 states into one of three types:

1. Parliaments with immediate veto position regarding military interventions based on simple majority votes
2. Parliaments with delayed veto position regarding military interventions or with veto position requiring qualified majorities

3. Parliament without specific veto positions regarding military intervention, i.e. parliaments having only general veto powers, for example by a vote of non confidence or by freezing the budget.

At present we are debating whether or not it might be advisable to split the single index and form two separate indices: first for issue-specific, proactive parliamentary control as co-governance of security policy, and second for reactive parliamentary control as monitoring of security policy. The co-governance index would cover parliamentary participation in intervention decisions, including information rights, the right to limit the scope of the mission, the right to end the mission and the requirement for the government to seek funding for military missions in advance. The monitoring index would include government reporting and publicity requirements, auditing rights, public parliamentary debates, rights to submit legislative acts and/or government decision to examination by supreme courts and last but not least the possibility of a vote of non confidence. The special focus of the second index would be on monitoring by the opposition and by individual members of parliament.

### 3.2 Measuring war participation

The next step will be to build an index in order to measure the degree of war participation of the EU-25. Although the Iraq war under examination in our research project is an international war in the classical sense we will also take into account the research about the "new wars" which draws our attention to the vast range of unconventional and asymmetric warfare. A special challenge will be to include secret military activities such as the recently debated deployment of two German secret service members in Iraq who allegedly communicated information to the military headquarters of the US-led coalition forces during the coalition attack.

We assume that parliamentary control will not just influence war participation as such but will also influence the scope, size, and timing of the war support and the rules of engagement for the troops deployed to the war. We will relate the index to the rationalist and normative motivations raised in the democratic peace debate discussed before. Rationalist interests concern the financial and material costs of the war and the risk for life of the soldiers deployed as well as for the citizens at home (for example terrorist attacks on the homeland). Normative factors concern the respect for international law, the preference for non-violent conflict resolution, and special features of collective identity, for example for Germany the anti-totalitarian tradition and the special relationship with Israel, for Sweden the tradition of neutrality, for the new democracies in Middle and Eastern Europe the claim to be part of the West etc.

For our comparative study these factors will be standardized in order to form four classes of involvement in the Iraq war:
1. No participation

2. Political support for the war, which might incur normative costs but not material costs, for example diplomatic support for the coalition of the willing, granting transit rights for coalition forces.

3. Support for the war which might incur normative as well as material costs but which does not include risk of life for national soldiers or citizens, for example financial contributions to the war effort, provision of military supply, training, medical services etc.

4. Full support for the war including active participation of combat troops or deployment of other militarily relevant personnel in the war zone.

We also intend to measure the degree of war participation not only immediately at beginning of the Iraq intervention ($T_1$), but again 90 days after the start of the war ($T_2$). There are basically three reasons for doing so. First, parliamentary control might be delayed. For example, the US War Powers Act passed by US Congress in 1973 is often quoted as best practice for parliamentary co-governance of military security policy (Sheffer 1999; Westerfield 1996; Nolte 1989). According to the War Powers Act the US President may deploy troops for military interventions abroad without Congressional consent for a maximum of 90 days. If Congress does not approve of the intervention 60 days after the intervention has started the President is obliged to start to pull back the troops and the troops must have left the conflict area completely after 90 days. Recently, the Centre for European Policy Studies (cf. http://www.ceps.be/Article.php?article_id=80) proposed to adopt the 60/90-day rule for European security policy as well.

Second, the "rally 'round the flag"-effect mentioned before means that a vast majority of citizens might grant the government an extraordinary scope for action during a national crisis and that the opposition will ally itself with the parliamentary majority in the national interest (Stoll 1987; Russett 1990: chap. 4; for the Iraq war cf. Szukala 2003). When the rally is effective, societal demand for military restraint will disappear. However, empirical research has found that this effect is short-lived and will not last more than 2 or three months (Lai/Reiter 2005: 265).

Finally, expected utility is the third reason for the $T_2$ measurement. Before and during the initial phase of the war cost-benefit calculations for political action of the government as well as the citizens might be based on speculations about the course of the war. When the war has been going on for three months, the political actors will most probably be able to calculate more realistically. Changing calculations might influence the perception of the war and thus the need for political action by the parliament.

### 3.3 Correlating parliamentary control capabilities and war involvement

We will collect the indices data on an ordinal scale. The combination of the two indices will result in a final table, which will make it possible to correlate the degree of parliamentarian
control as independent variable and the degree of war involvement as the dependent variable for $T_1$ and for $T_2$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of parliamentarian control regarding military interventions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parliaments with immediate veto position/ simple majority votes (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No participation (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War support incurs normative costs but not material costs (B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War support incurs normative and material costs (C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full war support including risk for life (D)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to our initial hypothesis for the parliamentary peace we should expect, that less powerful parliaments will leave their respective governments a wide scope for action irrespective of war aversive citizens (column three). However, we do not expect any particular distribution of the respective states within column three. For example, we cannot expect a significant accumulation in box A3. On the other hand, under the condition of a war aversive citizenship, powerful parliaments in respect to military intervention decisions should be expected to prevent governments from full or partial war participation. The respective cases should be located in box A 1. This effect should be even stronger after 90 days. Or to argue the other way round: Those states which are fully involved in the war and whose citizens are opposed to the war should ideally be found in box D3.

It might be especially interesting to identify deviant cases, i.e. states that were actively involved in the war despite public war aversion and extensive parliamentary control capabilities (boxes D1 or D2). It has to been seen whether such cases can be explained by delayed parliamentary monitoring or be the corrupting effects of parliamentary co-governance.

Born and Hänggi, in their recent study about parliamentary oversight of participation in peacekeeping operations, came to the conclusion that

> ‘the strongest means of parliamentary oversight by far is . . . the constitutional or legal right to approve or reject such use of force’ (Hänggi 2004: 14 [quote taken from Everts 2005]).

In contrast, budget and staff, while being indispensable to make use of legal authority, reflect rather than cause legal powers (Everts 2005). Using our detailed research results we would
also be able to substantiate or qualify their findings for full-fledged war participation. Using more detailed case studies, the next step of our research agenda would be to identify causal mechanisms that can help to explain correlations between the two variables.
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Despite strong public disapproval (see EOS-Gallup Europe’s International Crisis Survey of January 2003) several of the 25 current member states of the European Union (EU-25) actively participated in the US-led war against Iraq. This contradicts the (monadic) theory of democratic peace reaching back to Kant, which expects war-averse public majorities to be able to use democratic institutions to effectively constrain their government’s security policy.

Within our project the democratization of security policy will be operationalized as parliamentarization. Since there is hardly any comparative research on the role of parliaments regarding security policy matters, as a first step of the project, the scope and impact of parliamentary control over security policy matters will be operationalized as “index 1”. Using “index 1” the degree of parliamentarization of security policy will be measured for the EU-25. The foreign policy behavior of the EU-25 governments will then be measured on the basis of yet another index for the “burden of war participation in terms of the democratic peace” (“index 2”). Data for index 2 will be collected for March 2003, when the UN Security Council did not grant a mandate to the coalition forces and when the military campaign started, as well as for June 2003, immediately after the international war had ended and the UN Security Council had legalized the occupation regime. Subsequently, the two sets of data will be correlated in order to identify significant patterns of association between the two variables “degree of parliamentary control over security policy” and “burden of war participation in terms of the democratic peace”.

We appreciate funding for the project by the German Research Foundation (DFG). The project has started in February 2006 and will be completed in September 2007.
### paks working papers

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